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I. HISTORY OF APPROACHES TO THE TAXABLE UNIT
Policy choices are implicit in the income tax rules for attrib-
uting income to individuals. Unfortunately, the history of the in-
dividual income tax in the United States reveals a general lack
of scholarly concern with these underlying policies. Conse-
quently, administrative practice and court decrees have evolved
without coordination with the other elements of the tax system.
"[M]uch of the apparent illogic of the present pattern of adjust-
ing tax burdens for family circumstances can be best understood
as ihe fruit of ad hoc changes in the tax base or the taxable unit
rules in order to correct for unfairness caused by defects in the
attribution rules."1
A. Pre-1948 Treatment
The problem of attribution of income within the family was
left to the Commissioner and the courts until 1948. Prior to
1. McIntyre and Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simpli-
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1930, the original concept of the individual as the taxable unit,
with earned income attributed to the earner and property in-
come attributed to the title holder, was unquestioned. The
United States Supreme Court decided two cases that year which
raised questions about the original concept, however. In Poe v.
Seaborn,2 the Court held that under the law of community prop-
erty states, in which income earned by one spouse became prop-
erty of the marital community, each spouse would be attributed
with one-half of the income earned by the other. Yet the Court
had earlier held, in Lucas v. Earl,3 that a similar division pursu-
ant to a husband-wife contract would not control attribution of
earned income for federal tax purposes.
Given progressive tax rates, the differentiation among tax-
payers that resulted from Seaborn and Earl caused consterna-
tion among taxpayers in common-law states and consideration
among congressmen of statutory remedies for the perceived un-
fairness. These remedies included (1) mandatory joint returns
(i.e. aggregation of incomes of both spouses) for all couples, (2)
taxation of community income to the spouse exercising manage-
ment and control of the income in community property states,
and (3) mandatory joint returns with a special allowance for the
earned income of either spouse.4 Perhaps because relatively few
individuals were subject to .tax5 and overall tax rates were rela-
tively low, Congress felt insufficient need to adopt any of these
plans-they were defeated in 1941.6 With the onset of World
2. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
3. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
4. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE INCOME TAx TREAT-
MENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 21 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited
as COMMIrTEE REPORT].
5. The portion of the civilian labor force in 1935 was 8.9 percent; in 1940, 26.4 per-
cent. Id. at 22.
6.
Percentage of Tax as Percentage
Year Population Covered of Personal Income
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War II and the corresponding increase in tax rates, however, the
differences in taxpayer treatment became "conspicuous and in-
tolerable, ' '7 and several of the common-law states made statu-
tory efforts to change to the community property system. Be-
cause constitutional doubt had been cast on mandatory joint
returns in Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin," and be-
cause other proposals for raising the effective tax on community
property couples were defeated, the avoidance of a tax increase
to community property was an unspoken premise of the legisla-
tive debate leading to the adoption of income splitting for mar-
ried couples by Congress in the Revenue Act of 1948.10
B. Post-1948 Treatment
The Senate Finance Committee Report underscores the po-
litical nature of the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1948:
"Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce sub-
stantial geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on in-
dividual incomes. The impetuous enactment of community
property legislation by States that have long used the common
law will be forestalled." '11 The measure had the undoubted polit-
ical appeal of reducing taxes for the middle and upper-middle
income classes without disturbing the tax rates or causing any
absolute increase in the taxes of other groups. In retrospect, it is
doubtful that Congress "ever intended to alter the distribution
of the tax burden in the manner that ex-post analysis reveals." 2
Even in 1948, a foresighted observer cautioned, "[tihe Revenue
Act of 1948 appears to have been born under an ill-omened
The underlying personal income estimate for 1913 is the average for 1912-1916; that
for 1918 is the average for 1917-1921. See R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX,.4 (rev.
ed. 1976).
7. H. GROVES, TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY, 31 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
GROVES].
8. Oklahoma, Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
9. 284 U.S. 206, 213-14 (1930). There were also fears that the higher tax which
would result from such aggregation would encourage divorce for tax purposes, although it
was observed that such a phenomenon had not occurred under the aggregation method
employed in the United Kingdom. S. REP. No.. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 36 (1941).
10. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1416
(1975).
11. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1948).
12. GROVES, supra note 7, at 50.
[Vol. 34
4




Thus, in ostensibly seeking to restore the equality of tax
treatment of married couples lost as a result of Poe v. Seaborn,
Congress failed to realize that the advantage enjoyed by married
couples in community property states was over all other taxpay-
ers-single and married-and not just over married couples in
common-law states.14 The perceived need for haste led to a po-
litically expedient solution inadequate to forestall future claims
of tax discrimination by single taxpayers.
15
Under the income splitting provision, a married couple pays
the same tax per person as a single person with one-half the to-
tal taxable income. In 1948, eighty percent of married house-
holds had only one earner. 6 Thus, income splitting permitted
the vast majority of married earners to enjoy a lower tax bill
than their single counterparts at the same income level. For ex-
ample, at tax rates in effect between 1965 and 1970, a single-
earner married couple with taxable income of $32,000 would pay
$8,660 in federal income tax using income splitting and filing a
joint return. The unmarried earner of the same income would
pay $12,210-a difference of forty-one percent.
1 7
Supporters of the 1948 Act justified the unequal treatment
of unmarried taxpayers by focusing on the greater financial re-
sponsibilities of married couples. Despite this justification, it is
doubtful that Congress intended the pattern of unequal treat-
ment, increasing in value as income increases, as a correction of
the previous inequalities among married couples caused by Poe
v. Seaborn.8 In any event, the greater financial responsibility
justification raised the question of whether single heads of
households should be similarly recognized under the tax code. In
1951, Congress responded to this question by establishing a sep-
13. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1097 (1948)[hereinafter cited as Surrey].
14. Neither the Senate Committee report, supra note 11, nor the House Committee
report, H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), takes into account the disadvan-
tage suffered by taxpayers other than married couples in common-law states.
15. Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single Tax-
payers, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 667, 676 (1973).
16. Seitel, Judge: It Doesn't Pay to Wed and Work, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1978, at 1,
col. 1 (citing figures compiled by A. Munell)[hereinafter cited as Seitel].
17. 1965 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1 2, 4 (1964). Tax surcharges are ignored
in the calculation.
18. GROVES, supra note 7, at 61.
1983] 833
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arate tax rate schedule for single heads of households.
The 1951 legislation, however, further complicated the tax
system and created its own set of anomalies. For example, the
combination of the personal exemption and first dependent's ex-
emption meant a larger overall tax reduction for the single head
of household than for the married couple with the same taxable
income. This created a "divorce bonus" if each parent kept one
child and used the new tax rate.'- Furthermore, the definition of
"dependent" for single heads of households is different from
that used in the ordinary dependent's deduction, and the con-
cept of "maintaining a household" is not clearly defined. 0
Single persons without children increasingly perceived the
unfairness in their treatment under the federal tax system. Con-
gress did not respond until 1969, perhaps because average in-
come levels did not grow to the point where the difference was
felt acutely enough to cause significant complaint until after the
1950's.21 At some income levels, a single person's tax liability
was as much as 42.1 percent higher than that of a one-earner
married couple with the same taxable income.22 The solution of-
fered in the 1969 Tax Reform Act balanced the two extremes of
maintaining the existing status quo and offering the benefits of
splitting to single persons: a new lower rate schedule for singles
insured that the difference in tax liability between a single per-
son and a married couple with equal taxable income would not
exceed twenty percent. The continuing differential was justified
by the idea that the tax system should acknowledge additional
living expenses incurred by a married couple.23
However, the limited relief granted to single persons carried
19. COMMIrTE REPORT, supra note 4, at 37.
20. Id. at 38. In 1954, Congress unsuccessfully attempted to accord single heads of
households the full benefits of income splitting. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Seas.
(1954). The provision which passed extended dependent status to parents of single heads
of households, even if living separately, and allowed widows and widowers full income
splitting benefits for a period of two years following the death of the spouse. I.R.C. §
2(b)(1)(B)(dependent parents); § 1(a)(2)(surviving spouse) (CCH 1954). Most critics
would probably find the rationale behind this classification tenuous. GROvs, supra note
7, at 42.
21. As of 1958, 66.5 percent of all returns either did not qualify for the benefits of
splitting or received only small dollar benefits; only 17 percent received benefits signifi-
cantly greater than $40. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 72-73 (citing unpublished
dissertation of D. Thorson).
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
834 [Vol. 34
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with it a "marriage penalty" affecting two-earner couples, who
under the 1969 Act were no longer permitted to use the tax ta-
bles for singles. The 1969 Act technically abolished income split-
ting by carrying forward the pre-1969 rate schedule for married
couples filing jointly and severing the connection with the rates
applicable to single persons. Thus, the phenomenon of two equal
earners suffering a net tax increase by marrying became a part
of the tax system. Furthermore, the Act provided the same stan-
dard deductions for single and joint returns, thereby creating
another disadvantage to married couples. The Tax Reduction
Act of 1975, however, mitigated this problem by providing for
somewhat higher standard deductions on joint returns.
C. Present Treatment
The present scheme of four separate progressive tax rate
schedules resulted from the piecemeal congressional treatment
of the problems associated with choosing a fundamental unit of
taxation. More specifically, contradictory positions throughout
the tax code reveal consistent congressional indecision on the
proper treatment of married couples versus single persons.2' The
combination of these inconsistent provisions gives rise to what is
popularly known as the marriage penalty, the situation in which
a two-earner married couple pays more in tax under the joint
rates than they would if each were assessed separately under the
24. Some provisions treat each spouse separately, even on a joint return: Keogh
plans and Individual Retirement Accounts, the child care credit, the dividend exclusion
(with the exception of 1981 and 1982), and the Social Security payroll tax. Other provi-
sions give twice the single person's benefits to married couples filing jointly irrespective
of the interspousal distribution of the underlying economic factor: the personal exemp-
tion, the political contributions credit, first-year depreciation, loss on small business
stock, and (in 1981 and 1982) the dividend exclusion. Another set of provisions treats
single persons the same as married couples ("per return" provisions): the capital loss
deduction, the earned income credit, the investment tax credit, the addon minimum tax,
the disability income exclusion, the one-time capital gain exclusion for principal resi-
dence, the limitation on investment indebtedness, the casualty loss deduction, the medi-
cal insurance deduction, the moving expense deduction, the insulation credit, and the
deduction for removal of architectural barriers. Yet another group of provisions allows
married couples more benefits than single persons but less than twice as much: the eld-
erly credit, the zero bracket amount, and the "base amount" affecting inclusion of unem-
ployment compensation in taxable income. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-15.
Even the definition of marriage for tax purposes is not consistent throughout the tax
code. Id. at 18.
1983]
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single persons rate. The tax rate schedules and the zero bracket
amount are more important, because a marriage penalty gener-
ally exists whenever income is split more evenly than eighty to
twenty percent. The severity of the marriage penalty increases
the more evenly the taxable income is divided between the
spouses.2 5
The modern trend toward two-earner families has height-
ened the importance of the marriage penalty. In 1948, eighty
percent of American families were one-earner families. By 1970,
that figure had decreased to 36.6 percent, and by 1979 it fell
further to 29.7 percent.26 Conversely, the percentage of families
in which both husband and wife earned income rose from a
figure of 45.7 percent in 1970 to 50.9 percent in 1979.27
D. Proposals to Relieve the Marriage Penalty
The growing awareness of the magnitude and extent of the
25. Id. at 28. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE ECONOMIC REcovERY TAX ACT OF 1981, 33 (Comm. Print 1981)[hereinafter
cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION]. The size of the marriage penalty (or bonus) derived
from operation of the tax schedules and the zero bracket amount is shown below for
couples at various income levels and income splits between spouses under the 1979 tax
law.
EFFECT OF MARRIAGE ON TAX LIABiLrT AT SELECTED INCOME LEVELS AND EARNINGS
SPLITS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Share of lesser-earning spouse
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Total family
income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
$5,000 -250 -210 -170 -133 -98 -63 -28 0 0 0 0
$7,000 ...... -378 -315 -252 -189 -126 -66 -10 46 98 147 168
$10,000 .......... -474 -370 -275 -180 -85 10 100 162 182 200 202
$16,000 ....... -710 -516 -328 -148 32 132 183 220 236 243 251
$20,000 .......... -1,692 -760 -460 -160 42 150 238 300 355 381 391
$25,000 .......... -1,505 -1,055 -630 -268 -30 160 310 447 535 594 611
$30,000 ......... -1,920 -1,334 -749 -334 -26 214 439 644 785 875 9D3
$40,000 ........... -2,801 -1,821 -939 -338 177 667 1,031 1,329 1,564 1,644 1,692
$50,000 ......... ---3,344 -2,094 -1,094 -286 454 1,133 1,731 2,121 2,439 2,574 2,674
$100,000 ....... _-3,464 -1,214 359 1,691 2,699 3,474 4,014 4,314 4,369 4,394 4,394
The table assumes that taxpayers have no dependants and do not itemize deduc-
tions. Marriage penalties would be smaller, and marriage bonuses larger, for itemizers.
Marriage penalties are positive in the table; marriage bonuses are negative.
26. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 65.
27. Id. Table 2 shows a classification of two-earner families by contributions of the
wife's earnings for the year 1977.
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greater tax burden imposed on two-earner couples led to con-
gressional consideration of methods to alleviate the effect of the
marriage penalty. This concern resulted in the adoption of the
"second-earner deduction" as part of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981.28 Under the new provision, two-earner married
couples filing joint returns are entitled to a deduction of ten per-
cent (five percent for 1982) of the "qualified earned income" of
the lesser-earning spouse, up to a maximum deduction of $3,000.
Reasons given for the choice of the second-earner deduction over
other possible schemes included the belief that the greater tax
burden imposed on some two-earner families "undermined re-
spect for the family. . . and for the tax system itself' and the
feeling that the new provision would eliminate the work disin-
centive resulting from the taxation of the second earner's income
at higher effective marginal rates.29
In adopting the second-earner deduction, Congress rejected
several other proposals designed to reduce the marriage penalty.
NUMBER OF FAMILIES CLASSIFIED BY CONTRIBUTION OF WIFE'S EARNINGS TO FAMILY
INCOME IN 1977
[Number of families in thousands]
Percent earned by wife
Less 5to 10to 20 to 30 to 40 to 50 to 75 or Median
Family income Total than 9.9 19.9 29.9 39.9 49.9 74.9 more percent
5
Total ............... 24,839 3,203 2,285 4,223 4,456 4,406 3,330 2,361 574 26.1
Under $3,000 ........... 166 46 4 11 18 15 12 22 37 31.9
$3,000 to $4,999 ......... 303 37 36 48 37 26 27 44 47 28.1
$5,000 to $6,999 ......... 718 117 89 133 82 70 60 86 81 22.5
$7,000 to $9,999 ........ 1,678 247 194 245 236 202 192 257 104 26.5
$10,000 to $12,999 ..... 2,435 363 253 416 362 299 305 319 117 25.1
$13,000 to $14,999 ..... 1,842 241 204 290 313 269 226 235 63 25.9
$15,000 to $19,999 ...... 5,241 734 455 912 878 889 715 576 82 25.9
$20,000 to $24,999 ...... 4,654 548 363 712 897 975 754 389 18 27.9
$25,000 to $34,999 ....... 5,088 510 382 836 1,081 1,167 773 322 16 27.5
$35,000 to $49,999 ....... 2,040 218 201 456 441 405 230 89 1 23.3
$50,000 and over ........ 673 141 105 164 110 89 36 22 8 15.6
Median family income
(dollars) .............. 20,039 18,741 18,986 20,399 21,674 22,216 20,848 16,887 10,478
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Combining data from Tables 1 and 2 (noting that the result combines demographic
data from 1977 with tax computations under the 1979 tax law), one can see that approxi-
mately sixty-five percent of two-earner families suffered from the marriage penalty (by
authors' calculations).
28. I.R.C. § 221 (1981).
29. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 25, at 33-34.
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A second-earner credit, although more progressive than the de-
duction which was adopted, was considered insufficient to re-
duce the work disincentive at high marginal rates, as well as be-
ing more expensive in terms of revenue loss20 Mandatory
separate filing, which would have returned the tax system rough-
ly to the method in effect until 1948, required overriding com-
munity-property laws vis-a-vis attribution of earned income and
attributing investment income to the spouse owning the prop-
erty, (or alternatively, allocating investment income arbitrarily
in proportion to earned income, entirely to the higher earning
spouse, or equally between spouses). Problems identified with
mandatory separate filing included difficulties in allocating de-
ductions betwen spouses and the possibility that allocation rules
for investment income could create new marriage penalties or
bonuses. Moreover, mandatory separate filing would necessitate
writing new rules to prevent low-income earners with high-in-
come spouses from receiving benefits currently designed to reach
low-income singles, heads of households, or joint filers.3 Op-
tional separate filing posed many of the same technical difficul-
ties as well as additional complexity for taxpayers in computing
tax liability.3 2 Additionally, optional separate filing presumably
would result in substantial revenue loss.
33
II. INCONSISTENCIES AND INEQUITIES
A. Mutually Inconsistent Goals
Even when the government's intention is to use the tax sys-
tem purely to raise revenue and not to regulate social or eco-
nomic behavior, the goal of a neutral tax system is elusive, if not
unattainable. This elusiveness results from three desirable but
inconsistent considerations: 3'
30. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 59.
31. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 25, at 34; see also CoMMrTrTE REPORT, supra
note 24, at 47.
32. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 25, at 34.
33. ComnrTsm. REPORT, supra note 4, at 51. Revenue loss and offsetting general tax
increase were calculated at $7.0 billion and 3.4 percent if property income and deduc-
tions were allocated proportionately to earned income and at $8.7 billion and 4.3 percent
if property income and deductions were allocated equally. Id.
34. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1590. The Meade Report in its 1978
examination of the tax system of the United Kingdom listed six further considerations:
[Vol. 34
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Progressive rate structure. Whether based on the ability-
to-pay theory or the equal-sacrifice concept, the idea that the
average tax rate should rise as income increases has long been
a settled principle of the federal tax system.
Equal taxation of couples with equal incomes. Two
couples sharing the same joint income should pay the same
amount of tax irrespective of which spouse earned the income
or owns the property producing the income. This concept was
introduced into the tax system in 1948 with the adoption of
income splitting.
Marriage neutrality. There should be no penalty for mar-
riage; a married couple should pay no more tax jointly than
each spouse would pay if taxed as a single person. Nor should a
1. The incentive for a member of the family to earn should not be blunted by
tax considerations which depend on the economic position of other members of
the family.
2. Economic and financial arrangements within the family (e.g., with respect to
ownership of property) should not be dominated by sophisticated tax
considerations.
3. The tax system should be fair between families who rely on earnings and
families enjoying investment income.
4. Two persons living together and sharing household expenditures can live
more cheaply and therefore have a greater taxable capacity than two single
persons living separately.
5. The choice of tax units should not be excessively costly to the public fisc.
6. Taxing arrangements should be reasonably simple for taxpayers to under-
stand and for the taxing authorities to administer.
Lister, Taxation, Women, and the Family, TAXATioN AND SocIA POLICY 141 (C. Sand-
ford ed. 1980)[hereinafter cited as Lister].
The Meade Committee's findings were further examined in a Green Paper entitled
The Taxation of Husband and Wife, CMD. 8093 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Green Pa-
per]. The Green Paper identified the four criteria of fairness-simplicity, sex equality,
and privacy-as most important in the British tax system. Id. at 1. The concern for
privacy seems surprisingly strong in the British tax writings, stressing the need for hus-
bands and wives to be able to keep details of their incomes and taxes confidential from
each other. The Green Paper specifically addresses discrimination within the family, not-
ing in addition to the question of privacy the practice of attributing the wife's income to
the husband and crediting him with her earned income allowance. Id. at 12. One can
speculate that there is less concern in the United States with privacy between husband
and wife for two reasons: (1) filing jointly does not attribute the income of one spouse to
the other; rather, the income is considered as belonging to both spouses; and (2) Ameri-
can couples are given the choice of filing separately. Although the British system has
allowed separate assessment since 1914, privacy is not assured, since the couple pays the
same aggregate tax and the husband intent on discovering his wife's "secret" earnings
can figure the amount by calculating backwards from the amount of tax paid. Id. at 7. It
is interesting to note, however, that, given the choice between privacy (married filing
separately) and lower taxes (married filing jointly), only 1.3 percent of American couples
currently opt for privacy. CoMmrrrEEa REPORT, supra note 4, at 48.
11
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penalty exist for being single; a single person should pay no
more taxes than a person of equal income who is married to a
spouse with no income. Concern for marriage neutrality in the
tax system motivated the movements culminating in the reduc-
tion of tax rates for singles in 1969 and the deduction for sec-
ond earners in 1981.
To illustrate the inconsistency among the three objectives,
consider a single person with a $30,000 income. Under the prin-
ciple of marriage neutrality, he should pay the same tax as a
single-earner married couple with a $30,000 income. Comparing
the single-earner married couple with another married couple
where each spouse earns $15,000, the principle of equal taxation
of couples with equal incomes also suggests that the same tax be
paid. The principle of marriage neutrality further mandates that
this two-earner married couple should pay the same tax as two
single people each of whom earns $15,000. But when this last
pair of single persons, each earning $15,000, is compared with
the single person earning $30,000, the principle of progressivity
holds that the tax should be unequal-that the $30,000 earner
should pay more than the two $15,000 earners should pay
combined.
Until the adoption of the second-earner deduction in 1981,
the federal tax system generally observed the principles that in-
come should be taxed progressively and that equal-income
couples should be taxed equally. Thus, the principle of marriage
neutrality has necessarily been abandoned, with the burden of
inequity shifting somewhat from single persons to two-earner
married couples.3 5 The remainder of this section will consider
the three competing goals and the balance of equities involved
therein. It is assumed that the progressive rate structure will be
retained.
B. Horizontal Equity: Single Persons Versus Married
Couples
The adoption of income splitting for married couples in
35. McIntyre and Oldman suggest that the continuing dissatisfaction with the treat-
ment of single persons versus married couples after the 1969 Act stemmed from the fact
that the balance struck represented simply an ad hoc compromise without support in
any theory of an ideal income tax. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1 at 1595.
840 (Vol. 34
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1948 created a "tax on remaining single," in that a single person,
forbidden from splitting income, paid more tax than an equal-
income counterpart who split income with a no-income spouse.
The single person was better off, in terms of tax liability, by
finding someone with no income to marry. This phenomenon be-
comes more significant than the marriage penalty for two-earner
couples at lower income levels and presumably affects more peo-
ple.36 Despite the lowering of the tax rate for single taxpayers in
1969, the penalty for being single persists; the 1969 Act simply
lowered the maximum differential from more than forty percent
to around twenty percent. Perhaps because in 1948 some eighty
percent of married couples had only one earner,37 attention was
drawn to the comparison between single persons and married
couples for tax purposes.
1. Family Financial Responsibility Theory
After its enactment in 1948, the income splitting provision
came to be justified as an allowance for the expense of family
responsibilities.3 8 As a recognition of greater living expenses for
married couples, however, income splitting provides too great a
benefit. Intuitively, the spouse of a $100,000 single earner would
require little if any more than the spouse of a $20,000 single
earner in terms of support. Whatever greater expense is necessi-
tated by higher socio-economic class considerations should be
viewed as a discretionary, taxable expenditure. The added ex-
pense of child rearing is similarly insufficient as a partial justifi-
cation for income splitting in light of the lower tax benefit ac-
corded to single heads of households. Moreover, income splitting
does not differentiate between couples with children and couples
without children.3 9 Thus, it is not surprising that considerable
comment has been made about the "astonishingly large bonus to
marriage for high-income couples when most of the income ac-
crued to one partner.' 40
36. Id. at 1588.
37. Seitel, supra note 16, at 1, col. 1.
38. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1417.
39. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 95 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
PECHMAN].
40. Barr, The Taxation of Married Women's Incomes-I, 12 BRr. TAX REv. 398,
406 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Barr].
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One commentator has argued that the decision to get mar-
ried, given its personal nature, would justify granting the work-
ing spouse an additional exemption but no further rebate merely
because he or she prefers to spend money on a wife or husband
rather than it in other ways.41 However, the persuasiveness of
this argument is unclear. Marriage, albeit voluntary, has social
consequences which are more nearly fundamental than ordinary
consumption expenses. Moreover, if the rearing of children is
seen as at least partially imbued with a state interest, then in-
come splitting might be justified as advancing that state
interest.
It has been observed that a married couple actually has a
greater capacity to pay than do two single people with the same
combined income because of the presumed economies of scale
enjoyed by a married couple. Many economies of scale, however,
accrue to any set of people sharing expenses, whether married or
not, and whether living together or not. Census data reveal that
there were 1.3 million households in the United States shared by
two unrelated adults of the opposite sex in 1979, an increase of
157 percent since 1970.42 While this figure represents only three
percent among all couples, no figures are available on the num-
ber of households shared by unrelated adults of the same sex.
43
The number of shared-expense living units is therefore likely to
be much higher, with one estimate finding that 62.5 percent of
single people share a home with another person." Given these
data, it would be inconsistent to argue for the greater ability of
married couples to pay without applying the same reasoning to
single persons who share expenses. There are counter-argu-
ments, however, that a qualitative difference exists in the eco-
nomic behavior of the two categories-the greater prevalence of
"pooling" of income by married couples and the greater likeli-
41. Pechman, Income Splitting, 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 473, 479 (1959).
42. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27. The Bureau of the Census refers to
these people as "POSSLQ's" (person of the opposite sex sharing living quarters), thus
filling a void in the English language experienced by many Americans when making
introductions.
43. Id. at 28.
44, Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses
Are Working: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d
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hood that singles share out of a choice to economize, which
should not be penalized.45 In any event, measuring the extent of
economies of scale would be difficult and grossly intrusive. The
benefits of such a system would not likely outweigh the costs of
administration.4e Further, the tax system should not decide
whether people are arranging their lives efficiently or not.
47 Most
commentators writing after 1971 reject economies of scale com-
parisons between married couples and single people on two
grounds: (1) assumptions behind the concept of economies of
scale vary too frequently from actual experience to justify inclu-
sion in the tax rate schedule, and (2) comparative arguments
based on economies of scale operate best at lower income levels
and are less reliable as income level increases.48 For purposes of
evaluating the appropriateness of income splitting, then, the
economies of scale theory should probably be ignored.
Finally, income splitting does not account for the imputed
income of the one-earner married couple-the value of the home
services performed by the non-working spouse, such as cooking,
caring for children, performing household chores, and entertain-
ing.49 At the very least, a single-earner married couple, with one
spouse free to perform household tasks, plausibly has more real
income than the single person who leaves no one at home to do
housework, and may pay for services similar to those of the non-
working spouse. Arguably this benefit offsets any added burden
of support which the married single earner must carry.
45. Klein, Familial Relationships and Economic Well-Being: Family Unit Rules for
a Negative Income Tax, 8 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 361, 386 (1971).
46. Id. at 387.
47. Legislative Proposals Relating to the Comparative Income Tax Treatment of
Married Couples, Single Persons, and Heads of Households: Hearings Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1980)[hereinafter cited as
Hearings](statement of Robert S. McIntyre, Director, Public Citizen's Tax Reform Re-
search Group).
48. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Bur-
dens, 59 Tax. L. Rav. 1, 29 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Gann].
49. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text for discussion of the problematic
character of imputed income and possible methods for its taxation.
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2. Pooling Theory
a. Benefit Analysis
Because the family financial responsibility justification for
income splitting has not been successful, another theory sup-
porting preferential treatment of married couples vis-a-vis single
persons has been suggested. The "benefit" theory recognizes
that most taxpayers are married and the majority of marital
partnerships are real partnerships in which spouses share eco-
nomic benefits without much regard for the sources of the family
revenue.50 The thesis behind the theory is that income should be
attributed to the person who uses or benefits from the income. 1
Using the Haig-Simons definition of personal income-the mar-
ket value of consumption enjoyed during the taxable period plus
net change in savings-the rule is that each family member
should be taxed on the items he actually consumes or accumu-
lates, regardless of source.2 Thus, the focus is upon who in the
family benefits, and the tax is on the uses to which income is
put.
5 3
Under the benefit theory, the issue is the extent to which
sharing marital income justifies differential tax treatment. The
immediate question is how much benefit such spouse derives
from the income. 54 The degree of precision required by tax legis-
lation demands that the tax system ignore any possibility that
each individual may have different capacities to enjoy things
that income makes available.5 5 Income splitting assumes a fifty-
fifty split between husband and wife, and the benefit theory
posits that a single-earner couple is economically quite different
from a single taxpayer with the same income. The single-earner
couple should therefore pay less tax according to the benefit the-
ory under the rationale that "[lthe wife as tax shelter argument
...is faulty because it misapprehends the relationship between
50. McIntyre, Marriage Penalty: Problems with Individual Filing, 12 TAX NoTEs
741, 742 (1981).
51. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1575.
52. Id. at 1575-76.
53. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
317 (1972).
54. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1592-93.
55. GRovEs, supra note 7, at 18.
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the joint filing rule and the progressive rate structure. Under
joint filing with income splitting, married persons are assumed
to be sharing their incomes, one-half for the benefit of the
wife.",
6
While the benefit theory as applied to income splitting may
be plausible at lower income brackets, where income is almost
entirely for the consumption by family members, a fifty percent
consumption by the spouse at high income brackets is dubious.
5
7
Spouses do not equally share in savings accrued during mar-
riage.58 Nor do couples equally share important holdings such as
business assets, retirement funds, or pension rights."9 In fact,
some upper-income couples maintain completely separate for-
tunes.60 Because one justification of progressive taxation is to re-
duce the economic power of those individuals at very high in-
come levels,61 the benefit theory cannot adequately justify
income splitting. One commentator acknowledges that complete
pooling of income probably occurs only at the low and middle
income brackets.6 2 At minimum, the flaws in the benefit theory
allow the greatest tax benefit to the highest income taxpayers
who split income via the joint return.
Taken to its logical conclusions, the benefit rule would ex-
tend income splitting to all sets of individuals who pool income.
Given the increasing number of unmarried couples who may be
pooling income,63 a temptation exists to substitute "social reali-
56. McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Fu-
ture Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REv. 469, 482 (1980)[hereinafter cited as McIntyre, Individ-
ual Filing].
57. PECHMAN, supra note 39, at 94.
58. Taxation of the Family: A Panel Discussion, 1 CANADIAN TAxATION 16, 17
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion] (statement of Faye Woodman). Woodman
suggests income splitting in the low brackets and income aggregation at higher levels.
59. Dulude, Taxation of the Family: Joint Taxation of Spouses-A Feminist View,
1 CANA iN TAXATION 8, 9 (1979).
60. GRovEs, supra note 7, at 43 (citing unpublished dissertation of D. Thorson).
61. See PECHMAN, supra note 39, at 94.
62. McIntyre, Taxation of the Family: Economic Mutality and the Need for Joint
Filing, 1 CANADIAN TAxATION 13, 14 (1979)[hereinafter cited as McIntyre, Taxation of
the Family]. Alone among the commentators in the panel discussion, supra note 63, Mc-
Intyre holds to the idea that substantial real splitting of beneficial enjoyment occurs at
upper income levels. "It is only when you make assumptions of 100-0, 75-25, or 80-20
splitting that you produce radical differences in burdens of singles as against marrieds. I
could accept 60-40 splitting as a reasonable guess of reality, but I would find a guess of
100-0 or 80-20 splitting as fanciful." Id. at 15.
63. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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ties" for the traditional lines of distinction based on legal char-
acteristics such as marital status, support obligations, and rights
to property.6 4 One commentator has stated that the benefit rule
should extend income splitting to children, relatives, or anyone
who cohabits.0 5
Splitting would presumably alleviate a problem currently
faced by unmarried couples who desire to pool their incomes.
Depending on the structure of the pooling agreement, a transfer
of earnings may be considered taxable income to the recipient
under current law. While a bare pooling agreement may be char-
acterized as a gift,"6 taxable income would arise if it were seen as
a "purchase of companionship 6 7 or transfer of wealth in ex-
change for domestic services.6" Applying marketplace notions to
quasifamilial transactions may seem inappropriate, however, and
recognition of actual pooling with a corresponding benefit of
splitting is arguably better suited to these less-than-arm's-length
agreements.69
Immense difficulties arise, however, in deciding which pool-
ing situations will be recognized for tax purposes. For example, a
"domestic partnership" could require a minimum period of co-
habitation."0 A definition of domestic partnership would be diffi-
cult to reach politically and would pose problems in administra-
tion. Nonetheless, such a definition is necessary if splitting by
unmarried persons is to be permitted at all. Unless such situa-
tions are identified and made mandatory, unmarried couples
could choose whether to split income and have the best of both
worlds. Married taxpayers would not have this option.7 1 McIn-
tyre and Oldman acknowledge the difficulty of allowing unmar-
64. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1398.
65, Gann, supra note 48, at 25.
66. But cf. Jones v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1977)(taxable income arose
from "gifts" to female taxpayer by male friend; decision influenced by taxpayer's testi-
mony that friend was "getting his money's worth"); Angstadt v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 693 (1968)(male taxpayer denied dependency exemption for support of unmarried
female cohabitant on grounds that the woman received "compensation for services ren-
dered rather than support").
67. Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmaried Co-
habitants, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240, 1245 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Wolk].
68. See 26 CFR § 1.61-2(d)(1981).
69. Wolk, supra note 67, at 1245.
70. Id. at 1301. Wolk suggests three years.
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ried persons to split pooled income under the benefit theory.
They suggest that a fiscal definition of marriage might be fore-
seeable, 2 but the administrative tasks involved in developing
and enforcing the tests for "fiscal marriage" would be
formidable.
Finally, extension of splitting to unmarried persons via the
benefit rule may have the effect of encouraging people to enter
into marriage-like relationships without the legal status of mat-
rimony. The possibility of exploitation of one party without legal
rights may be sufficient in terms of social policy to keep the tax
system from adopting the benefit theory.73 Administratively and
socially, then, income splitting should be considered only within
the bonds of matrimony, for better or worse.
b. Aggregation Analysis
The same notions of pooling of income and the family unit
that support income splitting under the benefit theory apply
equally well to the theory of aggregation of family income. Ag-
gregation involves combining total family income and taxing it
at the single persons rate. Under the aggregation approach, the
family is seen as a unit of economic mutuality within which the
individual members are sufficiently intermeshed economically to
be considered a unit for taxpaying purposes.7' As opposed to the
benefit theory, the aggregation concept is that the economic
well-being of the entire household should govern the relative size
of its contribution to the public fise.7 5 If it is true that husbands
and wives typically pool income, then using the individual in-
come of each is a poor index of a couple's economic situation.78
Many government agencies, particularly those concerned with
public assistance, use the family budget as the fundamental
72. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1597.
73. Panel Discussion, supra note 58, at 19 (statement of Michael J. McIntyre). But
some legal rights as to property may be upheld if one nonmarital partner can prove
either an express or implied contract. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
74. London, Taxation of the Family: The Family as the Basic Tax Unit, 1 CANA-
DIAN TA XATiON 4, 5 (1979).
75. Brazer, Comment, COMREHENSIVE INcoME TAxATiN, 237 (J. Pechman ed.
1977)[hereinafter cited as Brazer].
76. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1579.
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unit.7 The Carter Commission, studying the Canadian tax sys-
tem in the mid-sixties, concluded "[t]axation of the individual in
S.. disregard of his inevitably close financial and economic ties
with the other members of the basic social unit of which he is
ordinarily a member, the family, is in our view [a] striking ex-
ample of [a] lack of a comprehensive and rational pattern in
[the] tax system.
'7 8
Under the Canadian view, use of the family unit and the
aggregation theory is justified in three ways:79 (1) The family re-
flects the "basic economic and financial entity" in society. Since
resources are pooled within the unit, intrafamily transfers
should not be taxed. While in reality the family unit may extend
beyond parents and children, considerations of administrative
convenience and the problems of tax free transfers between gen-
erations militate against recognizing any extended family unit.
(2) Horizontal equity among married couples is achieved because
aggregation eliminates problems of unequal spousal distribution
of income and problems associated with income splitting. Verti-
cal equity considerations are served in that because the family
unit gives a clearer picture of discretionary income, the family
units should be equitably compared. (3) Since under the aggre-
gation theory intrafamily transfers and splitting arrangements
need no longer be policed, administration of the tax system is
simpler.
As with the theory of progressive tax rates, ability to pay is
a central concept in aggregation. As long as the concept of in-
come aggregation comports with the actual practice of consump-
tion within particular families, the variations in the allocation of
consumption within particular families have no bearing on the
ability of the family unit to pay taxes.80
Under the pure theory of income aggregation, the income of
minor children is included with that of the parents.8" While it is
77. See GROVES, supra note 7, at 43.
78. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAX'N 122 (1966).
79. Id. at 124.
80. McMahon, Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of
Children and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 89 (1981)[hereinafter cited as McMahon].
81. The benefit theory in its pure form would consolidate children's income with
that of the parents if the income were in fact pooled. To avoid administrative problems
in this determination, since such consolidation would presumably result in a higher fam-
ily tax bill, McIntyre and Oldman propose a rule that consolidation be mandatory if a
848 [Vol. 34
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/2
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
argued that children's income, at least in families above the sub-
sistence level, is not pooled with parents' income for general
family use, actual pooling of the child's income is not required to
justify aggregation if such income indirectly benefits the family
by freeing part of the parents' income. The use of the child's
income to meet his own consumption needs enhances the fam-
fly's economic power.
8 2
Aggregation of children's income is attacked on the ground
that it would create disincentives to children's work, given the
higher marginal rate that would apply. If the earnings of chil-
dren are generally small, however, it would seem that a dollar-
amount exemption for a child's earnings would solve the prob-
lem. Whatever benefits derive from the educational value of
work to the child would not be diminished by higher marginal
taxation, since the educational value is imputed income and not
taxed. In any event, any loss of "educational effect" would not
outweigh the positive horizontal and vertical equity considera-
tions of aggregation. 3 Even if most children do not pool their
income with the rest of the family but save it for specific per-
sonal consumption, no work disincentive results because likely
children are relatively tax-inelastic and would work more in or-
der to achieve whatever goal was set.84 Assuming arguendo a
work disincentive, the question becomes whether the disincen-
tive is significant in light of the relatively small contribution
made by children to the average family income and, collectively,
to the national income. 5
Separate arguments support the aggregation of children's
income from property, even if it is accepted that earnings should
be separately taxed to the child. At minimum, income from
property transferred to a child by the parents should be aggre-
gated with family income, since transfers are usually seen as tax
avoidance devices despite other motives recognized in judicial
opinions.8 6 Substantial gifts of property to children occur mainly
dependent's exemption be claimed for the child. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at
1604.
82. McMahon, supra note 80, at 85.
83. Id. at 93.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 108; GROVES, supra note 7, at 98. The Canadian system taxes income from
property transferred to or for the benefit of a minor to the transferor, whether related or
19831 849
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in the upper income brackets,"7 where the principle of progres-
sivity suggests that tax avoidance is an important motivation.
There is an argument that income from gifts of property to mi-
nor children by third parties should also be taxed to the parents,
who benefit by being relieved of likely future support.8 8 Aggrega-
tion of such third-party donated property as income to a child's
parents may discourage gifts to children by third parties, and is
accepted as a necessary implication of the theory8 "
The most serious criticism of the aggregation theory is that
it would greatly increase the marriage penalty. Under progres-
sive rates, two earners who married would face a higher tax bill
than the combination of their taxes as single persons. The insti-
tution of aggregation seems politically unfeasible. In fact, a 1941
proposal to tax marital income by aggregation was defeated par-
tially on grounds that the measure would encourage divorce for
tax reasons.90 The United Kingdom employs the principle of ag-
gregation in its tax system, and despite generous mitigating fac-
tors such as the Married Man's Allowance and the Wife's
Earned Income Allowance, a substantial movement has occurred
in favor of a system of individual taxation. 1 While aggregation
was the prevalent pattern in Europe historically, 92 international
trends within the past decade have been in the direction- of indi-
vidual taxation. In Canada, the Carter Commission's compre-
not. In the United Kingdom, investment income from property given to children by par-
ents is taxed to the parents, a change from the former rule taxing all children's invest-
ment income from whatever source to the parents. McMahon, supra note 80, at 109.
87. McMahon, supra note 80, at 106.
88. Id..
89. See Comment, Tax Treatment of the Family: The Canadian Royal Commission
on Taxation and the Internal Revenue Code, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 98, 122 (1968). Whether
such discouragement is a distortion of rational economic behavior or whether the status
quo is the distortion are separate questions.
90. HousE WAYS AND MEANS CoMMrrrEE, REvENUE REvIsiONS OF 1941, 1422 (1941),
cited in GROVES, supra note 7, at 35. It was observed, however, that the British divorce
rate in 1941 was not as high as that of the United States despite the use of the aggrega-
tion method, although a rather generous "married man's allowance" mitigated the effect
of the higher nominal tax.
91. Green Paper, supra note 34, at 73.
92. McIntyre, Taxation of the Family, supra note 62, at 15.
93. Currently Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy tax income from
all sources to individuals; Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
Finland tax earned income individually but aggregate investment income; France, Lux-
embourg, Spain, and Switzerland aggregate income in a family tax. Judge, Ireland:
Changes in Personal Taxation, 20 EuR. TAx'N 76, 80 (1980).
[Vol. 34
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/2
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
hensive recommendations for the establishment of aggregation-
based taxation have been ignored in favor of the status quo of
individual taxation.94 The consensus seems to be that whatever
justification there may be for the principle of aggregation, it is
not "tax logic" but the political perception of social realities.9 5
3. Source Theory
Although income splitting is best explained under the bene-
fit theory, and by implication, the concept of income pooling, it
is a tenuous justification. It seems reasonable, then, to reexam-
ine the original theory upon which the income tax was based,
that of taxation according to source. Under the source theory,
which taxes income on the basis of legal title, the only explana-
tion for income splitting would be as recognition of the imputed
income from the care of home and children.9 6 Such an idea is
unsatisfactory because the value of imputed income would rise
progressively with income. 7
Because no theory has yet provided convincing support for
income splitting, it should be abandoned. Although real eco-
nomic differences may exist between married couples and single
France is a special case. The family is treated as an economic community, with all
income taxed to the head of the household but income split according to a quotient
system under which the divisor is the sum of husband and wife at one each, plus children
at one-half each. The effect is similar to income splitting in the United States except
that the tax benefit increases not only with income but also with family size. The tax
system reflects a public policy of encouraging childbearing. M. NORR, WORLD TAX SE-
RIEs: TAXATION IN FRANCE 862, 866 (1966).
The Supreme Court of Ireland, interestingly, has recently rejected aggregation as
being repugnant to Ireland's constitutional pledge to "guard with special care the institu-
tion of Marriage on which the Family is founded and to protect it against attack." Fran-
cis Murphy and Mary Murphy v. The Attorney General, Judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ireland, delivered Jan. 25, 1980. The Court, while acknowledging that the State
confers many revenue, social, and other advantages and privileges on married couples
and their children, nevertheless held that "the nature and potentially progressive extent
of the burden created by aggregation as required under the Income Tax Act ... is such
that.., it is a breach of the pledge by the State.. . , not compensated for or justified
by such advantages and privileges." After the Court's decision, the Minister of Finance
decided to allow full income splitting, effective April 1980. Judge, supra, at 76.
94. Goodwin, Provincial Marital Property Laws Recently Enacted or Proposed, 29
CANADIAN TAX FouND. 215, 232 (1977).
95. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1397.
96. See Groves, Taxing the Family Unit: The Carter Commission's proposals and
U.S. Practice, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 109, 111 (1969).
97. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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persons, perhaps traceable to social and legal consequences of
marriage more fundamental than ordinary consumption ex-
penses,9 8 such differences can be remedied by exclusions, deduc-
tions, or credits.
C. Horizontal Equity: One-Earner Versus Two-Earner
Couples
1. Constitutionality of the Marriage Penalty
In addition to favoring one-earner married couples over sin-
gle persons at the same income level, income splitting, combined
with the separate tax rate table for single persons, creates a mar-
riage penalty on two-earner couples when the lesser earner con-
tributes at least 20 percent to the combined income of the two
spouses.99 After the single person rate table became effective in
1971, married taxpayers became increasingly aware of the tax
disparity from which they suffered. As a result, several constitu-
tional challenges were brought.100
In the most recent case, Mapes v. United States,101 taxpay-
ers argued that the marriage penalty burdened the fundamental
right to marry recognized by the Supreme Court in Zablocki v.
Redhail102 and thus called for strict judicial scrutiny. The Court
of Claims declined the exercise of strict scrutiny, reasoning from
Califano v. Jobst03 that such a test is appropriate only when the
98. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1421.
99. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
100. The constitutionality of the single persons penalty was also challenged. In Kel-
lems v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 556 (1972), taxpayer's assertion that the amount of tax paid by
her in excess of that which would be payable if joint return rates were applied to her
income was not an income tax but a penalty for remaining single was rejected by the
court as being without merit, since no evidence was submitted showing the intent of
Congress was to regulate or restrict or penalize persons who are not married. The court
also upheld the tax rate system as having a rational basis for the distinction drawn be-
tween married and single persons, namely that it was reasonable for Congress to attempt
to achieve geographic equality between commonlaw and community-property states and
that the degree of recognition given by Congress to the problem of greater financial bur-
dens on the part of married taxpayers was within the discretion of Congress.
101. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. CL 1978).
102. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
103. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Jobst challenged as interfering with the right to marry the
provisions of the Social Security Act that benefits to a dependent child terminate upon
the parent's marriage to an individual not eligible for Social Security benefits.
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obstacle to marriage is direct, entirely precluding marriage for a
certain class of people. The court noted that, although the ele-
vated tax burden might dissuade some couples from marrying,
others may be encouraged, stating "[the burden] is suffered not
for marrying but for marrying one in a particular income
group. '10 4 The taxpayers also argued for heightened scrutiny on
grounds of discrimination against women, claiming that the tax
code implicitly treats wives as secondary earners and taxes the
wife's income at high marginal rates, thus interfering with the
wife's constitutional right to pursue a career. The Court of
Claims rejected this argument as well, observing that the tax
code is sex neutral and does not treat either spouse's income as
primary or secondary. Furthermore, even if the rates were
founded upon discriminatory stereotypes, the income splitting
system did not work to the detriment of all women.10 5 The court
thus examined the taxpayers' claims under the reasonableness
standard.
The taxpayers argued that treating equal-income married
couples equally irrespective of division of contribution conflicts
with the fundamental principle of progression, citing the propo-
sition that extra expenses make a two-earner couple worse off
than a single-earner couple.10 6 The court rejected this argument,
holding that although the taxpayers had demonstrated imperfec-
tions in the tax system, the imperfections were insufficient to
mandate invalidation of the income splitting provisions. The
court then concluded that, given the inevitability of such dispar-
ities, the judiciary would not interfere with legislative determi-
nation of the balance of inequities.'17
104. Mapes, 576 F.2d at 901.
105. A third constitutional challenge, that the marriage penalty interfered with a
taxpayer's freedom of religious practice, was similarly rejected in Johnson v. United
States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550
F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
106. Bittker, supra note 10; G. BREAK AND J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM, THE
IiaossmrL DREAM (1975).
107. As a remedy, the court suggested that "the tax-minded young man and woman,
whose relative incomes place them in the disfavored group, will seriously consider cohab-
itation without marriage," given that, otherwise, "our Internal Revenue Code provides an
opportunity to the young to demonstrate the depth of their unselfishness" through
higher contributions to the federal fisc. Mapes, 576 F.2d at 898. But cf. Francis Murphy
and Mary Murphy v. The Attorney General, supra note 93, declaring a greater tax bur-
den on married people void as against the Irish constitution's protection of the family.
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Another possible constitutional challenge to income split-
ting, based on the tenth amendment by way of National League
of Cities v. Usery,108 argues that Congress, through the tax laws,
is effectively regulating marriage, a province of state law.109
However, the tax code appears to base itself upon the local fam-
ily law and not vice versa. Even assuming that some state inter-
est is infringed, "[c]ongress need not be circumscribed by
whatever lines are drawn by local law."1110
2. Tax Divorces
The constitutionality of the marriage penalty having been
upheld, other taxpayers sought to avoid the effects of income
splitting through more ingenious devices. In Boyter v. Commis-
sioner,"" a married couple were divorced in December of 1975
and 1976 in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively, and
remarried in January of the year following each divorce. They
filed tax returns as singles for those tax years on the basis of
Internal Revenue Code sections 143(a) and 6013(d)(1)(A). 11 2 The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency
on the grounds that the foreign divorces would not be recognized
as valid in the couple's home state since the foreign courts did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. Al-
though the court did not reach the Commissioner's argument
based on Revenue Ruling 76-255,113 which provides that, even if
the divorces were valid under the law of the home state, they
should be disregarded for tax purposes because a year-end di-
vorce in which the parties intend to and do remarry early in the
next year is a sham transaction, such treatment of tax divorces
likely would also be sustained. In any event, tax divorces are not
likely to become a popular means of avoiding the effects of the
marriage penalty for the majority of two-earner couples.
1 14
108. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
109. Note, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single Tax-
payers, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 667, 682 (1973).
110. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
111. 74 T.C. 989 (1980).
112. These sections provide that marital status for tax purposes is determined an of
the end of the taxable year.
113. 1976-2 C.B. 40.
114. Interestingly, the Boyters divorced for the third time in 1977 and have been
living together ever since, thus legitimately availing themselves of I.R.C. §§ 143(a) and
[Vol. 34
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3. Distinctions Between One-Earner and Two-Earner
Couples
Practically, the marriage penalty may not often influence
decisions as to marriage status, although statistical evidence of
increased cohabitation among unmarried adults of the opposite
sex shows a prima facie correlation.115 Even if no clear cause-
and-effect relationship is demonstrated, the increasing incidence
of the marriage penalty 16 demands that serious consideration be
given to the goal of marriage neutrality within the tax system.
The first step in this analysis is an examination of the relative
equities of those who benefit from the marriage "bonus" of in-
come splitting and those who suffer from its penalty. Three dis-
tinctions can be made with respect to oneearner and two-earner
married couples: (1) the imputed income of the non-earning
spouse, (2) the work disincentive effect of the marriage penalty
on the second-earner spouse, and (3) the additional work ex-
penses of the second-earner spouse.
a. Imputed Income
One commentator has stated that a household in which one
adult earns the income while the other stays at home has greater
real income and a higher real standard of living than a two-
earner household with the same money income."1 " The reason
for the supposed larger real income of one-earner family is the
value of the services performed in the home by the non-earner
spouse, alleviating the need to purchase those services in the
marketplace. This concept is known as imputed income. By con-
sidering only monetary income, some argue, the tax system
yields a poor measure of ability to pay under equity criteria. 1 8
The non-earner spouse is free to spend his time producing im-
puted income that is not taxable under the present system. By
contrast, the two-earner family does not have as much time
available to produce imputed income, because both spouses are
6013(d)(1)(A) for subsequent tax years. Hearings, supra note 47, at 164 (statement of
Angela M. Boyter).
115. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
117. Andrews, Comment, COMPREHENSIVE INcoME TAX'N 235 (J. Pechman ed. 1977).
118. Gann, supra note 48, at 32.
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employed, pay tax on their earned income, and either hire others
to perform the household services or perform the services them-
selves as best they can.
Assuming that imputed income does give one-earner couples
greater real income and thus greater ability to pay, a problem
arises as to how imputed income should be taken into account
for tax purposes. Given the enormous variety in the nature and
quality of services performed and the difficulty in placing dollar
values on them, it would be near impossible to tax imputed in-
come directly. What adjustments would be made for the fact
that some spouses are better housekeepers than others, or that
some care for five children while others have only one?11 Fur-
thermore, once imputed income is deemed taxable, linedrawing
questions arise. Should the value of home cooking be computed
with regard to the cost of eating at a fast-food chain or dining at
an haute cuisine restaurant? Should imputed income arise from
mowing one's own lawn or shoveling the snow from one's own
driveway?
Perhaps a reasonable approach would be to consider only
those services which most one-earner families perform and most
two-earner families purchase. Several difficulties surface with
this method, however. Many two-earner couples perform the
same household services usually associated with a non-earning
spouse, especially in the case of child care. Yet, in order to per-
form these services and work as well, two-earner couples must
sacrifice leisure time, raising the more general question of
whether leisure time itself should be taxed, irrespective of the
uses to which it is put. Under this approach, two-earner couples
collectively would have less taxable leisure time than would one-
earner couples. 120 It can be argued that the leisure of the non-
earning spouse-or its alternative characterization as imputed
income-constitutes an option to earn, a potential to contribute
monetary rather than imputed income to the family budget.
This option to earn, like most options, has its own intrinsic
119. Cf. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1615.
120. Id. at 1614-1617. McIntyre and Oldman question the value of a policy which
would assign an increased share of the tax burden to the unemployed, children, retirees,
and students-those with the greatest amounts of leisure time. Id. at 1617. The only
kind of leisure in question, however, is the relatively greater leisure time available to
one-earner couples than to two-earner couples.
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value. The concept finds an alternative expression in the greater
security enjoyed by a one-earner family, which has a spouse "in
reserve" in case of the incapacity of the breadwinner.121
Inconsistencies arise in an imputed income analysis. While
as a general rule a one-earner couple may be better off in terms
of real income than a two-earner couple, a couple receiving all of
its income from property would appear to have as much or more
imputed income as the one-earner couple. Similarly, if both
spouses work only half-time, each would have imputed income,
which, when combined, might equal that of a one-earner couple
having equal money income. Inequities would result in an im-
puted income analysis because the concept is limited in its ap-
plication to aiding the understanding of the equities between
one and two-earner couples.
Considering the relative equities among two-earner couples
with both partners working full-time, allocation of income ac-
cording to source results in tax treatment which varies according
to the relative .contribution of the partners. Because income is
taxed to each partner on an individual basis at progressive tax
rates and splitting is not allowed, two partners each contributing
fifty percent of the joint income pay less tax combined than do
two partners earning equal income but with a relative contribu-
tion ratio of seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent. Simi-
larly, the 75:25 percent couple pays less combined tax than a
couple with a 95:5 ratio. Income splitting would also treat these
couples differently, but in inverse order, with the tax decreasing
as the disparity in relative contribution increased.
122
Under income splitting, the marriage penalty occurs when-
ever the relative contribution is more nearly equal than an
eighty percent to twenty percent ratio.12 3 Conversely, under sep-
arate taxation, those couples in which the second earner contrib-
utes less than twenty percent of the joint income pay more taxes
121. GROVES, supra note 7, at 58.
122. Using figures from Table 1, supra note 25, under income splitting, partners
contributing $15,000 each to a family income of $30,000 pay $903 more in taxes than
they would if taxed on their separate contributions. The 75:25 couple, contributing
$22,500 and $7,500 respectively, would pay $214 more in taxes. The couple with the
greatest disparity in their relative contribution, the 95:5 couple, contributing $28,500 and
$1,500 respectively, would save $1,334 in taxes under an income splitting system. At the
extreme of the spectrum, a one-earner couple would save $1,929 in taxes.
123. CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.
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than they would under income splitting. Assuming the lesser-
earning spouse earns the $3.35 per hour minimum wage, yearly
earnings would be $6,700, based on a forty-hour work week for
fifty weeks. Using this figure as the lowest possible yearly in-
come for a full-time wage earner, and figuring it in as twenty
percent of a couple's joint income, the couple would earn
$33,500. A two-earner couple with joint income above the
$33,500 level would be adversely affected by a switch from in-
come splitting to separate taxation, since the minimum wage
second earner would be contributing less than twenty percent of
the couple's joint income. Below the $33,500 level, the minimum
wage second earner would be contributing more than twenty
percent, and this "working poor" couple would benefit from sep-
arate taxation.
A final, albeit tentative, argument justifying differential
treatment of two-earner couples is that, as the relative contribu-
tions of the two spouses grow more unbalanced, the greater
earning spouse moves into a higher socio-economic class, with
increasing job status. The lesser-earning spouse tends to be car-
ried along, generating imputed income which mitigates the effect
of separate taxation on such taxpayers.
b. Work Disincentives
Another factor in the balance of equities between one-
earner and two-earner couples is the disincentive to work alleg-
edly suffered by the second earner as a result of income split-
ting. Statistical studies show that married women are much
more sensitive to tax considerations in work decisions than are
married men or single persons.124 Assuming that wives are more
likely than husbands to be second earners, income splitting ar-
guably operates to discourage wives from working, since it sub-
jects the income of the second earner to tax at the first earner's
marginal rate. The higher rate of taxation on the second earner,
viewed in light of the assumption that most second earners are
wives and the fact that work at home is not taxed, permits the
inference that the tax system-perhaps unintention-
ally-embodies a policy of encouraging married women to re-
124. See, e.g., Rosen, Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint Wage-Hours De-
terminations, 44 ECONOMErRicA 485, 507 (1976).
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main in the home.125 This subliminal policy was challenged as
being unconstitutional in Mapes v. United States.12 Although
the Court rejected the discrimination argument on the ground
that the tax code is facially sex-neutral, the equitable argument
that real-life discrimination exists is nonetheless valid for policy
consideration, in which intent is not as important as effect. The
effect of the tax system indeed reinforces other factors such as
job discrimination and societal pressures, which make it difficult
for women to achieve equality in the labor market.127 The
counter argument-that the tax system is not at fault if a mar-
ried women, because of stereotyped views of marriage, considers
herself a marginal worker-ignores the real-life effect of the tax
system. 128
The work disincentive effect has also been found to create
behavioral change, resulting in misallocation of resources and ec-
onomic inefficiency. 29 Efficiency theorists have concluded that
taxpayer behavior responds to how the tax system treats second
earner income. The price of home goods and services is artifi-
cially lowered as a consequence of omitting unpaid work at
home from the tax base, resulting in higher production of home
goods and services, yielding a misallocation of resources.1 30
One commentator has cast doubt on both the equity and
the efficiency arguments, asserting that alleged second earner
tax elasticity is relatively unimportant because it measures only
the economic response of second earners already in the labor
force, not the effect of the tax system on the initial decision to
enter the labor market. This commentator contends that the
higher marginal tax rate on second earners actually leads to an
increase in the labor supply,' 3' and that no real discentive exists.
125. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM
L. REv. 27, 36 (1978). Gerzog observes that this policy is reinforced by the FICA system,
under which a two-earner couple makes twice the contribution of a single-earner couple
yet draws only one and one-third the benefit. Id. at 37; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)-(b),
402(k)(3)(A) (1976).
126. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
127. Hearings, supra note 47, at 136 (statement of June O'Neill, economist).
128. McIntyre, Individual Filing, supra note 56, at 484.
129. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities? 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 735, 738 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bittker,
Equity].
130. Hearings, supra note 47, at 136 (statement of June O'Neill, economist).
131. McIntyre, Individual Filing, supra note 56, at 486.
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People who must work will work; those who do not need to work,
will not. However, the increase in number and percentage of
working spouses 132 does not negate the existence of the disin-
centive, but merely indicates that the disincentive has been
overcome, in many instances, by family economic need for a sec-
ond income and the non-economic sociological changes in the at-
titudes of women toward work outside the home.""3 The disin-
centive still exists for those spouses who have not entered the
labor market; and for those spouses the entire economy suffers a
loss of efficiency measured by the difference between foregone
salary and the imputed income from staying at home.""
c. Additional Work Expenses
The final factor creating an imbalance in the equities be-
tween one-earner and two-earner couples is the greater work-re-
lated expense incurred when both spouses are employed. The
problem arises because many work-related ex-
penses-commuting expenses, business clothes, perhaps a sec-
ond automobile-are not usually deductible as business ex-
penses and thus are treated under the tax code and regulations
as personal expenses which the worker must absorb. Because the
two-earner couple would have to pay, in effect, twice the work-
related expenses of a one-earner couple with equal income, these
expenses can be seen as another equitable imbalance from which
the two-earner couple suffers.
Section 44A of the tax code provides relief for employment-
related expenses for two-earner couples and working single per-
sons who have a child or children under age fifteen and/or a
physically or mentally incapacitated dependent or spouse. A tax-
payer in these situations can take a credit against tax owed for
certain dependent-care and household expenses "if incurred to
enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed."'3 5 However, prior
to the enacting of the predecessor of Section 44A, the Tax Court
held, in Smith v. Commissioner,3 6 that child care and related
132. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
133. Gann, supra note 48, at 43.
134. COMmTTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
135. I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2)(A).
136. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
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expenses were personal and not deductible. The first child care
provision, enacted in 1954, gave a very limited benefit by al-
lowing an itemized deduction in hardship cases. 37 In 1964 the
limits were raised, but only slightly.138 A deduction for house-
hold expenses was incorporated within the child care provision
in 1971, and the maximum income limit was raised from $6,000
to $18,000 with a phase-out up to $27,000. The benefit was ex-
tended to married couples with both spouses working full-time
that year as well."" In 1976 the itemized deduction was changed
to a credit of twenty percent of these expenses, up to a maxi-
mum credit of $400 for one dependent's expense and $800 for
the expenses of two or more dependants, with no limit on the
taxpayer's income. However, the 1976 changes replaced the re-
quirement that both spouses work full-time with a limit on al-
lowable expenses, stating that expenses could not exceed the
earned income of the lesser-earning spouse. 4" Finally, in 1981
the credit was increased to thirty percent of expenses, with a
maximum of $2,400 for one dependant and $4,800 for two. The
allowable percentage decreased over a sliding scale from thirty
percent at an income of $10,000, to twenty percent at $28,000
and above.
14'
Three rationales for the child care expenses allowance have
been put forward: alleviation of hardship, removal of work disin-
centive, and business expense. While the original intent seems to
have been to create a subsidy for the lower income brackets, the
1971 changes expanded the ambit of the provision to cover
working people with moderate incomes as well, providing an op-
portunity for both spouses to work outside the home. 42 How-
ever, the idea of removing the work disincentive was not fol
lowed consistently, because the income limitation resulted in no
removal of the joint return effect at higher marginal rates, where
the work disincentive presumably is greatest. The 1976 removal
of the income limitation was only a hesitating step toward con-
sistency, because Congress also changed the measure from a de-
137. I.R.C. § 214 (1954).
138. Revenue Act of 1964 § 214.
139. Revenue Act of 1971 § 214.
140. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 44A.
141. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 44A.
142. Schreiber and Yoran, Child Care Expenses: A Proposal for a More Equitable
and Efficient Tax Treatment, 54 TAxEs 345, 348 (1976).
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duction to a tax credit, thus making the benefit more valuable at
lower income levels and less valuable as income increased. In-
deed, the legislative history of the 1981 change, which left in
place the basic framework of capped tax credit with no income
level limit, speaks both in terms of work disincentive and target-
ing toward low to middle-income taxpayers: "Congress believed
that the child care credit provides a substantial work incentive
for families with children . . . . The increases in the credit per-
centage are directed toward low and middle-income taxpayers
because the Congress believed that these taxpayers are in great-
est need of relief. ' 143 However, the work disincentive rationale
seems unsatisfactory in light of the fact that the relief accorded
under the child care provision does nothing to eliminate similar
work disincentives suffered by childless couples. 144 Thus the
child care deduction is not an effective way of neutralizing the
disincentive effect created by joint filing.
145
Attempts to characterize the child care expense provision as
a simple business deduction initially were rejected. In Nammack
v. Commissioner, 46 it was argued that the deduction in effect for
the year 1965 was a recognition of the additional business ex-
penses of affected taxpayers and, accordingly, there should be no
income limit as to its applicability. The Tax Court held, how-
ever, that the deduction was a matter of legislative grace and
that congressional treatment of child care as a limited business
expense by establishing ceilings on income level and allowable
deduction was not arbitrary.147 The language of the 1971 exten-
sion of the household expense deduction-"if incurred to enable
the taxpayer to be gainfully employed" 4 8 -indicated a business
expense justification for the deduction. In 1976, Congress further
implied a business expense justification by removing the income
limit, extending the benefit-changed from a deduction to a
credit-to all otherwise qualified taxpayers. In the words of the
143. JOINT CoMMITrrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, 53 (Comm. Print 1981).
144. Harmelink and Shurtz, Child Care Expenses: Current Status and Alterna-
tives, 53 TAxEs 479, 481 (1975).
145. Arnold, The Deduction for Child Care Expenses in the United States and Ca-
nada: A Comparative Analysis, 12 W. ONTAmO L. REV. 1, 35 (1973).
146. 56 T.C. 1379 (1971).
147. Id. at 1383.
148. See supra note 135.
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1975 House Committee report, "such expenses should be viewed
as a cost of earning income for which all working taxpayers may
make a claim."'1 9 However, the use of a credit instead of a de-
duction tends to undercut the business expense rationale. Be-
cause credits are worth more at lower marginal rates, the mea-
sure appears to provide more relief to lower income taxpayers.150
Furthermore, as observed in the work disincentive rationale, re-
lief is accorded only to taxpayers with children. 5'
Part of the conceptual difficulty inheres in the dual nature
of child care expenses dealt with in the provision. For example,
when the employment of the second earner is not due to
financial need, the allowance more likely serves personal rather
than economic ends. 52 Certainly expenses for household ser-
vices, included within the provision since 1971, seem more per-
sonal than business in nature and should be treated the same as
commuting expenses. True child care expenses, by contrast,
share attributes with travel and entertainment expenses in that,
strictly speaking, only the incremental cost of the activity over
the expense normally incurred at home is a business expense;
yet with travel and entertainment, the full expense is deductible.
Child care expenses also differ from household expenses in that
household chores can be left undone, yet a child cannot be left
unattended. 153 Questions arise under the child care expenses al-
lowance as to whether the government should use taxation to
support the decision to bear children, whether the rearing of
children is a personal decision,"' and whether the state has re-
sponsibility to the next generation to help families with children
achieve the same standard of living as the childless. 155 In any
event, the child care expense provision of the tax code does not
satisfactorily account for the increased work expenses of the
two-earner couple.
149. H.R. REP. No. 658 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1975). The Senate committee re-
port contained nearly identical language. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
150. McIntyre, Evaluating the New Tax Credit for Child Care and Maid Service, 5
TAx NOTES 7, 8 (1977).
151. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
152. Keane, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Child Care Expenses, 10 HARV. J.
oN LEGIS. 1, 10 (1973).
153. Schaffer and Berman, Dissents and Concurrances, 28 TAX L. REv. 535, 544-45
(1973).
154. E.g., GROVES, supra note 7, at 22; Brazer, supra note 75, at 240.
155. Lister, supra note 34, at 147.
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D. Mutually Inconsistent Goals Revisited
The conclusion to be drawn from examining the balance of
equities between one and two-earner couples is that two-earner
couples are substantially disfavored under the current tax sys-
tem. The political origin of income splitting should no longer be
a factor in the present tax treatment of married couples. Indeed,
the paradigm of the single-earner couple is no longer valid. Re-
cent cases, departing from settled rules, recognize sociological
and demographic change. In Daly v. Commissioner,'" the tax
home rule was abandoned to allow a husband to deduct long dis-
tance commuting expenses while the wife was employed in the
couple's home town. In Nye v. United States,157 a two-earner
couple was treated as two separate economic entities for pur-
poses of an installment sale from one spouse to the other, fol-
lowed by sale to a third party.
58
With the emergence of a new socio-economic norm, the goal
of marriage neutrality assumes greater importance in the tax
system. While a state interest arguably exists in discouraging
one spouse from working to prevent a glut in the labor market 59
or to encourage the performance of services in the home, these
policies, if desirable, should be endorsed outright throughi the
political process. Until these conscious policy decisions are
made, the tax system should be neutral as to these choices. The
marriage penalty no longer is justifiable in tax policy. Accord-
ingly, since the three goals which introduced this section are ac-
knowledged to be mutually inconsistent, where conflicts exist,
the goal of marriage neutrality should override that of treating
couples with equal money income equally.
III. PROPOSALS FOR A COHERENT TAx SYSTEM
The discussions of historical political pressures in part I of
this Article and the inconsistencies and inequities in part H re-
veal that no system of taxation will be ideal; some inconsisten-
156. 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'g 72 T.C. 190 (1979).
157. 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
158. 1973-1 C.B. 213 (rejecting Revenue Ruling 73-157).
159. Mess, For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U. L.
RE.V. 87, 98 (1978).
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cies and inequities will remain no matter which system is cho-
sen. Consequently, political pressures will continue to test the
choice. Nevertheless, some systems are better than others. In an
effort to determine whether the most satisfactory-or merely the
most politically expedient-balance was struck between the
competing forces, examinations of the specific proposals most re-
cently rejected by Congress as well as the second-earner deduc-
tion provision adopted as part of the Economic Recovery tax Act
of 1981 are appropriate.
A. Optional Separate Filing as Single Persons
Allowing married couples the option of filing separately us-
ing the rate for single taxpayers poses many of the same techni-
cal difficulties of dividing marital income as would a system of
mandatory separate filing160 and adds complexity to tht system.
It would also result in substantial revenue loss. 61 Optional
separate filing reduces the marriage penalty and offers the ad-
vantage of a slight departure from the current system.16 2 Per-
haps the greatest shortcoming of this proposal, however, is that
it does not conclusively resolve the question of what is the
proper tax unit. Optional separate filing would retain the availa-
bility of income splitting, a feature of the tax system which has
been seriously questioned. Furthermore, the introduction of the
option would seem to obscure the rationale of the tax code as it
pertains to the relative taxation of single persons and married
couples.163
B. Aggregation
The concept of aggregation of marital income based on abil-
ity to pay and income pooling was discussed earlier.16 4 A funda-
mental difficulty with aggregation is that the extent to which in-
come pooling represents actual economic practice in family units
is far from clear. Furthermore-perhaps explaining why Con-
160. See infra notes 182-229 and accompanying text.
161. CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
162. See Gann, supra note 48, at 68.
163. Cook, The Frustrations of the Marriage Tax, 13 TAx NoTEs 265, 267
(1981)[hereinafter cited as Cook].
164. See supra notes 74-95.
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gress did not consider aggregation in its most recent reexamina-
tion of the income tax-aggregation would greatly increase the
penalty suffered when two earners marry, since, given progres-
sive rates, the married couple's tax bill would be greater than
the sum of their tax liabilities as single persons. If the balance of
equities indicated the desirability of a more nearly marriage
neutral tax system, aggregation must be rejected.
C. Quotient-Based Splitting
An alternative also not introduced in Congress is the quo-
tient system, currently used in France. This method is an en-
hancement of income splitting, dividing family income for tax
purposes among spouses and children, thus giving the greatest
benefit to the single-earner family with the greatest number of
children. Adoption of this system in the United States would ex-
acerbate the inequities now resulting from income splitting and
therefore is not recommended absent a conscious policy choice
favoring large families and a preference for the tax system over,
for example, the social security system as the means for accom-
plishing the policy goal.
D. Second-Earner Credit
A credit for two-earner couples is similar to the second-
earner deduction adopted as a part of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 in that a portion of the earnings of the lesser
earning spouse is not taxed. Equally as simple and more progres-
sive than a deduction, the credit is less effective per dollar of
revenue loss in reducing the work disincentive at the higher
marginal rates where, presumably, the disincentive effect is
greatest. Although the credit escapes the criticism of the "up-
side-down subsidy" effect of a deduction, credits are inappropri-
ate as an allowance intended to reflect income. Thus, if the pur-
pose of the second-earner allowance is to account for the greater
work expenses of a two-earner couple, the second-earner credit
is not as accurate as the second-earner deduction.165 If part of
the purpose of the allowance is relief for lower income two-
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earner couples, however, a credit would be preferable to a
deduction.
A fundamental problem created by the second-earner credit
is that, by adding new inconsistencies and inequities atop those
already within the multiple rates and income splitting, the credit
makes an already incoherent tax system more complex.
E. Second-Earner Deduction
The 1980 Joint Committee Report called the proposal for a
second-earner deduction, later adopted as part of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, "the simplest way of reducing the
marriage penalty and marginal tax rates on second earners."166
This is because the deduction is applied without disturbing the
rest of the tax system. The second-earner deduction, however, is
not without difficulties. Because the provision applies only to
"qualified earned income,"167 a technical problem exists in dis-
tinguishing between earned and unearned income,168 and in de-
termining what constitutes employment.16 9
Even as a solution to the problem of mitigating the effects
of the marriage penalty on second-earner couples, the provision
is flawed. Since the deduction is not limited to those second
earners who contribute at least twenty percent of family income-
those who would suffer from the marriage penalty-the deduc-
tion allows some couples to enjoy both the marriage bonus pro-
vided by income splitting and the relief extended by the second-
earner deduction. Although a limitation of the availability of the
deduction to taxpayers actually subject to the marriage penalty
would create a tax trap at the cutoff point,17 0 a phase-out provi-
sion could minimize the effect of such a trap. In any event, the
deduction seems preferable to a double benefit, which exacer-
bates both the one-earner-versus-two-earner and single-versus-
married inequities.17 1 The provision is also flawed if its purpose
is to remedy the plight of two-earner couples who have no im-
166. CommIrTT REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
167. I.R.C. § 221 (1981).
168. Thomas, Marriage Tax "Reform": An Analysis of the Reagan Proposal, 13
TAX NOTES 259, 263 (1981).
169. GROVES, supra note 7, at 81 n.33.
170. CoMMirrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.
171. Hearings, supra note 47.
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puted income and are therefore worse off in real terms than
their single-earner counterparts. Because the deduction has no
requirement linking it to full-time work only, it is not suffi-
ciently precise, and benefits those second earners with high pay-
ing part-time jobs.
172
The legislative history shows that, in addition to the mar-
riage penalty, Congress was concerned with the following other
issues: the effect the penalty had on respect for the family; the
work disincentive effect of high effective marginal tax rates on
the second earner's income; the greater work-related expenses
incurred by two-earner couples vis-a-vis single-earner couples;
and the lesser amount of free time available to two-earner
couples. 7 3 The second-earner deduction is too narrow insofar as
the latter two issues are concerned, because it does not allow for
similar differences between single persons and one-earner
couples vis-a-vis those taxpayers who receive all of their income
from property.17 4 A general earned income credit would provide
a reflection of the difference in the use of time and energy, how-
ever imprecise in monetary terms, for all earners. 75 However,
such an allowance to a substantial part of the population would
have to be small or it would result in a massive shift of the tax
burden to property income. 176 Of course, the foregoing observa-
tion would not apply if the second-earner deduction was moti-
vated fundamentally by political concern for the special plight of
the working wife and was intended to be taken as a symbol of
Congressional approval of the employment of married women
outside the home. 
7 7
The most serious criticism of the second-earner deduction is
that it does not satisfactorily resolve the problem of multiple tax
rates based on marital status. A quandary exists in separating
tax allowances from the structural features of a "normal" in-
172. See McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1622.
173. Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 33, 34 (Comm. Print 1981).
174. Gann, supra note 48, at 36.
176. Cf. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv.
309, 377 (1972) ("That difference in use of time and energy, while not easy to value
precisely in monetary terms, is arguably better reflected even crudely than left out of
account altogether.").
176. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1622.
177. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1437.
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come tax. 17 8 Furthermore, the second-earner deduction ignores
the basic question of what the appropriate tax unit should be,
and constitutes an acceptance of income splitting as the norm.
Revenue effects of the second-earner deduction were esti-
mated at a loss of $3.6 billion to $3.7 billion."" The deduction
will increase the relative burden on single persons and one-
earner married couples correspondingly. Apart from a system of
mandatory separate filing, however, the second-earner deduction
represents the cheapest provision, in terms of revenue loss, for
relief of the marriage penalty, 8 °0 making it all the more attrac-
tive politically. 81
F. Mandatory Separate Filing
Mandatory separate filing for married taxpayers provides
the best comprehensive approach to the problems discussed in
this Article. Under mandatory separate filing, all individuals
subject to income tax are assessed as individuals and pay tax
according to a single rate scale. Instead of accounting for depen-
dents through application of a different tax scale, deductions or
credits are allowed. Because mandatory separate filing com-
promises the goal of equal taxation of couples with equal in-
come, it would require acceptance of a shift in the balance of
equities between different groups of taxpayers. It also poses cer-
tain technical problems. Most of the technical problems can be
solved, however, and ample justification exists for the shift in
the balance of equities.
1. Advantages
Mandatory separate filing provides four basic advantages.
First, it eliminates the work disincentive for the second-earner
spouse, because it does not begin taxation of the second earner's
income at the marginal rate of the first earner, thus minimizing
178. Cf. Bittker, Equity, supra note 129, at 747. ("[A]re statutory provisions which
reduce the tax on income from personal services ... commendable features which miti-
gate a misallocation that is otherwise inherent in the tax itself, or are they sources of
affirmative misallocation?").
179. See CoMmrrTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
180. Id. at 48, 51, 59, 62.
181. Gann, supra note 48, at 37.
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distortion in the second earner's decision to work outside the
home. 182 Second, mandatory separate filing simplifies the tax
system and ends the obfuscation of policy choices and effects
caused by multiple tax rate scales. Third, mandatory separate
filing ends the need to apologize for the effects of income split-
ting by removing income splitting from the tax system. Finally,
the new scheme renders the tax system generally marriage neu-
tral, thus insulating an individual from "capricious changes in
tax burdens when marriage occurs."e 3 The failure adequately to
account for and tax imputed income of a non-earner spouse or





Income splitting, originally justified as an attempt to recog-
nize the expense of supporting a non-earning spouse,185 is re-
jected under mandatory separate filing. Other techniques must
thus be employed adequately to account for such support obliga-
tions. Greater use of exemptions can accomplish this task.
Four views of dependants exist, affecting the choice of
method for recognizing support obligations through tax relief. 86
First, dependents may be viewed as a consumption choice, in
which case no tax allowance would be indicated. An exception
would be an allowance for only those dependents to whom the
taxpayer owes legal obligation for support. Second, dependents
may be viewed as a future source of support for the taxpayer,
and expenses would be seen as investment. No tax recognition
would accrue. 87 Third, the decision to have children, represent-
ing an irretrievable choice by the taxpayer, would require sup-
port of the dependants, in turn diminishing taxpaying capacity.
A tax allowance would be appropriate, particularly if the tax-
payer's support of dependants represents a state interest. Fi-
182. Barr, supra note 40, at 403, 478, 488.
183. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing? 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 427 (1977).
184. Barr, supra note 40, at 488.
185. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
186. Bittker, supra note 10 at 1445.
187. It is generally agreed that this concept of the dependent is archaic.
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nally, the state may wish to reflect a population policy through
the tax system. Allowance for dependants may then vary with
the number and type of dependants.
Arguably, allowances for dependents should be limited to
the lowest income brackets.18  However, it seems generally ac-
cepted that the tax system should acknowledge at least the min-
imum expenses necessary to satisfy legal obligations of support.
-If such recognition takes the form of a deduction from gross in-
come, progressive rates render the deduction more valuable to
those in higher tax brackets. This feature of a deduction seems
to be too great a benefit to higher bracket taxpayers because ac-
tual expenses for support of dependents probably do not rise as
fast as the value of the deduction.189 Furthermore, the increased
expenses of support at higher income levels probably exceed the
minimum level of support and should therefore be regarded as
discretionary. The effect of progression on the value of a deduc-
tion indeed tends to contradict one of the theories of progression
itself: that the application of progressive rates, at least in the
upper brackets, is a matter of controlling economic power.190
For political, equitable, and administrative reasons, how-
ever, restricting allowances for dependents to lower income tax-
payers may not be advisable. A credit, calculated on the basis of
the tax which would be owed on an income just sufficient to
meet basic support expenses, seems more equitable. Extended to
all taxpayers, such a credit would contribute to a perception of
fairness in the tax system without giving higher bracket taxpay-
ers a disproportionate benefit.
The next question is whether the credit should be uniform
or vary according to the type of dependent and, if varied, what
the relative size of the credit should be. Budget studies show
that the expense of supporting a child is less than that for an
adult dependent; that the cost per child decreases as family size
increases; and that the cost of support for a married couple is
188. E.g., GROVES, supra note 7, at 22. The argument in a nutshell is that acquisi-
tion of a spouse and/or children is a voluntary choice and therefore the expenses are
personal; such expenses should be borne by the government, if at all, only when the
taxpayer lacks the means to bear them himself. See also Brannon and Morss, The Tax
Allowance for Dependents: Deductions Versus Credits, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 599, 605 (1973).
189. Comment, Tax Treatment of the Family: The Canadian Royal Commission on
Taxation and the Internal Revenue Code, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 98, 105 (1968).
190. H. GRovEs, TAX PHmosoPHERs 71 (1974).
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less than that for two single persons. 91 The relative incomes
that would provide roughly equivalent standards of living for
single persons, married couples, and dependents appear to be in
the ratio of 80:100:25.92 These figures suggest the appropriate
variations which should be instituted in the tax credits. 93
In the case of a dependent spouse with no income, a credit
equal to that of the taxpayer should be allowed. Despite argu-
ments that expenses for support of a spouse are mere consump-
tion expenses, differences exist in terms of legal obligations and
general social interest in such support. Because the one-earner
couple would suffer most under a mandatory separate filing sys-
tem, allowing two full credits may be justified despite the likeli-
hood that the couple's minimal support requirements are less
than the combined expenses of two single persons. Furthermore,
fairness requires that the one-earner couple receive the same
personal credits as the two-earner couple, who would presuma-
bly receive one full credit for each spouse. By the same token,
second-earner spouses earning income too small to qualify for
the full personal credit should be allowed to transfer the unused
191. GROVES, supra note 7, at 85.
192. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLicy, 75 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX].
193. Indeed, the history of the tax code's treatment of personal and dependent ex-
emptions as shown in Table 3 reveals considerable variation in the relative size of the
allowance depending on the type of dependent.
Year Single Married Persons Children
Person
Dollars Percentage Dollars Percentage
of single of single
person's person's
exemption exemption
1913 $3,000 $4,000 133 $ 0 0
1917 1,000 2,000 200 200 20
1921 1,000 2,500 250 400 40
1925 1,500 3,500 233 400 27
1932 1,000 2,500 150 400 40
1940 800 2,000 250 400 50
1941 750 1,500 200 400 53
1942 500 1,200 240 350 70
1944 500 1,000 200 500 100
1948 600 1,200 200 600 100
U,S. Department of the Treasury, Individual Income Tax Exemptions (1947).
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portion to the higher earning spouse."' Requiring married tax-
payers, taxed separately under this proposal, to file on the same
tax return form would minimize administrative problems.
Allowances for children and the treatment of children's in-
come pose special problems. The fact that the expense of sup-
porting a child is considered to be less than that for an adult
suggests that a full credit for each child is too generous, espe-
cially at lower income levels. 19 5 A half credit for each child
therefore is recommended. The idea of a sliding scale for each
additional child must be rejected in favor of simplicity. Since
the allowance is in the form of a credit and not a deduction, the
credit can be allocated to whichever parent provides support, or
to either if both provide support. Unless they marry at an earlier
age, children would not be permitted a credit against their own
income until they reach age eighteen. Upon reaching age eigh-
teen, the child would be entitled to a full personal credit, and
the half-credit to the parent would cease. If, however, the eigh-
teen-year-old did not have enough income to qualify for the full
credit, parents would be allowed the full credit as long as the
child remained a dependent as determined under current
rules. 196 This measure is designed to eliminate the double deduc-
tion now available when children have income. While this treat-
ment of children's income-taxing from the first dollar of in-
come upwards-may seem harsh by comparison to the current
system, it follows that because children are carried as credits to
the parent's income tax liability, no personal allowance to the
child himself is indicated.197 Furthermore, lower tax rates
financed by the revenue gain from the switch to mandatory
separate filing would relieve the burden."9 ' An earned income
credit for children, if deemed desirable, would provide further
relief. Arguably, this treatment of children's income would en-
194. This type of transferable allowance is based on the proposal of the Green Pa-
per, supra note 34, at 22.
195. See GROVES, supra note 7, at 85. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX, supra note 192, at 75.
See also McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1607.
196. Allowing a full credit to parents of an eighteen-year-old with little or no income
would be justified by the likelihood that the eighteen-year-old would be in college, and
would therefore present an even greater expense to the parents.
197. For counter-arguments to the work disincentive and loss of educational effect,
see supra note 83-85 and accompanying text.
198. See CoMMrrrnE REPORT, supra note 4, at 48.
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courage early marriage, but such an effect likely would not be
widespread.
Because no marriage penalty would exist and two-earner
couples would be relatively better off than equal-income single-
earner couples, the child care allowance is not necessary under
mandatory separate filing. The possibility exists, however, of in-
equity between two-earner couples with children and those with-
out children.
b. Allocation of Deductions
Under mandatory separate filing, the proper allocation of
deductions not arising under the current system of filing must
be addressed. Under the current system, marital income and de-
ductions from that income are aggregated. Exact allocation of
deductions to the appropriate spouse presents difficult adminis-
trative problems of tracing, often to the point of such minutiae
as determining which spouse wrote a given check or the proper
treatment of a payment made from a joint checking account. An
arbitrary rule seems preferable, although admittedly such a rule
"violate[s] the spirit of separate filing and create[s] [its] own
marriage bonuses or penalties .. ."I" Since a fifty-fifty rule
would pose difficulties of transferability in one-income families
and those two-earner families in which the lesser-earning spouse
had income insufficient to offset fully the half share of the total
deductions available, deductions should be allocated according
to the proportional share of family income of each spouse. This
method has an analogy in Revenue Ruling 80-7,200 which simi-
larly allocated deductions in calculating a spouse's allocable
share of joint income for purposes of determining that spouse's
share of a refund.
c. Effect of Poe v. Seaborn
Taxation of income according to the system of mandatory
separate filing, with earned income allocated to the earner,
would necessitate overriding Poe v. Seaborn.0 1 Ironically, al-
199. Id. at 44.
200. 1980-1 C.B. 296.
201. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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46
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/2
INDIVIDUAL INCOmE TAX
though Seaborn gave rise to the movement for geographical
equality of tax treatment which resulted in the adoption of in-
come splitting in 1948, it seems generally agreed that a federal
overriding of state property law for tax purposes would now sur-
vive constitutional challenge.0 2 Indeed, like several other provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, the second-earner deduction
adopted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 pro-
vides for the determination of qualified earned income "without
regard to any community property laws.
'20 3
d. Treatment of Income from Property
Property income raises the most complex problems under
the proposed system of mandatory separate filing. Current law
taxes such income to the owner of the asset as determined under
state property law. Application of this ownership test as between
spouses is usually an academic question under the current in-
come splitting provisions, because allocation between husband
and wife is not necessary. Taxation of this income to the spouse
whose earned income was used to purchase a given investment
causes tracing difficulties which, when compounded over time,
prove too great to be overcome by any reasonably simple system
of tax administration. Under the proposed system an arbitrary
fiftyfifty split or allocation according to proportion of earned in-
come seemingly would provide a new, and undue, form of mar-
riage bonus or penalty. The one relatively simple case appears to
be joint interests in property under state law, which could be
allocated fifty-fifty. 04
Since earned income is produced by human capital not eligi-
ble for depreciation allowance and, unlike unearned income, ne-
cessitates a loss of leisure, unearned income arguably should be
taxed at a higher rate. °5 One means of so doing would be to
aggregate a married couple's property income, while taxing
earned income separately. However, such treatment of property
income would amount to a marriage penalty, since the income
from one spouse's investments would be stacked atop the
202. E.g., Cook, supra note 163, at 271.
203. I.R.C. § 221(b) (1981).
204. But see, CommrrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
205. Lister, supra note 34, at 159.
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other's, resulting in a higher marginal rate of taxation than if
the income were taxed to the spouse separately. Moreover, and
more importantly, any differential treatment of income from
property necessitates distinguishing between earned and
unearned income, an often subtle task rife with potential for
great administrative cost and litigation. Although in the past,
provisions of the tax code, such as the maximum tax on earned
income, have depended on this distinction, the wisest course is
to eschew complexity and strive for simplicity. Income from
property should therefore be taxed at the same rate as earned
income, to the person holding legal title.
e. Income Shifting
Of course, by rejecting both splitting and aggregation of in-
come from property, mandatory separate filing encourages shift-
ing of property to the lesser-earning spouse. Attempts to reshuf-
fle property interests, common before 1948, were eliminated by
the income-splitting provisions.2"' Shifting interferes with the
balance of equities both horizontally and vertically, since fami-
lies can reduce their aggregate tax liability to the extent that
income from investments can be shifted from one spouse to the
other to achieve an even income split.
Many commentators point to the situation under Canada's
separate filing system, in which serious income shifting problems
have been identified.20 7 The response of the Canadian taxing au-
thority has been to attribute to the transferor income from cer-
tain kinds of property transferred between spouses, leading to
tracing difficulties as well as problems in distinguishing the vari-
ous kinds of property.208 Because taxpayers frequently have
been successful in showing non-tax reasons for the transfer,
catch-all provisions in the similar tax codes of Australia and
New Zealand, which void any such arrangements entered into
for tax avoidance purposes, have been only moderately
206. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1590. Of course, adoption of income
splitting between husband and wife did nothing to deter further splitting via transfers to
children.
207. E.g., id. at 1590 n.65.








Under mandatory separate filing, tax conscious individuals
likely would reexamine many of the techniques that had been
available fore 1948 for income shifting between husband and
wife, such as direct gifts of income-producing property, joint
ownership, family partnerships, and family trusts. In evaluating
whether the new measure was necessary to put an end to inge-
nious private splitting devices, a contemporary critique of the
income splitting provision adopted in 1948 observed that "[t]he
courts are doing a respectable job in separating the wheat from
the chaff in this field. Those tax advisers who . . . calmly
weighed the pros and cons of Supreme Court precedent clearly
recognized [in many cases] that the judicial gamble could not be
won. ' 210 Insofar as family partnerships are concerned, in Com-
missioner v. Culbertson,2 1 the Supreme Court laid down criteria
for establishing a valid arrangement for tax purposes. Family
corporations have been rendered less attractive as tax avoidance
devices by the combination of the double tax on corporate in-
come with the reduction of the maximum individual tax rate to
fifty percent.
Trusts, widely used by taxpayers to shift income to chil-
dren, pose special problems. Presumably, under the mandatory
separate filing system, these trusts would serve as vehicles for
shifting income to lesserearning spouses. Because the beneficiary
of a trust is taxed on the income that is distributable or distrib-
uted to him, with the balance taxed to the trust as a separate
entity, a favorable income split will result when the tax brackets
of trust and beneficiary are lower than those of the grantor.
When accumulated income, taxed to the trust, later is distrib-
uted, it is taxed to the beneficiary under I.R.C. sections 665
through 668. Income can thus be diverted from a high bracket
taxpayer to a lower bracket taxpayer without giving the benefi-
ciary a present right to the income.
Although the Clifford regulations21 2 control some egregious
taxpayer abuse of the trust device, there are complaints that
trusts still provide too great a benefit to high income individu-
209. McMahon, supra note 80, at 78.
210. Surrey, supra note 13, at 1111.
211. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
212. 26 CFR §§ 1.661-.665 (1982).
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als.2"3 Many commentators recommend that trusts no longer be
recognized as separate tax entities.214 The American Law Insti-
tute is currently considering more fundamental changes in the
tax treatment of trusts, which would reduce the potential advan-
tage taxpayers could otherwise take under the mandatory
separate filing system. 15 General rules proposed include taxa-
tion of trust income not currently distributable (or even if cur-
rently distributable if the donee is the grantor or the grantor's
spouse) to the grantor if alive, or to the trust at highest individ-
ual tax rates if the grantor is not alive.21 ' This proposal, if
adopted, would virtually eliminate the use of trusts as a means
of shifting income to a spouse, whether or not income is cur-
rently distributable, and to a child, unless the income is cur-
rently distributable.
Nothing in the proposed system of mandatory separate
filing would present income shifting to a lower bracket spouse or
child through outright transfer of legal title to property. How-
ever, such title transfer maintains a modicum of self-discipline.
Several commentators have noted that the present system of in-
come splitting has in practice allowed the husband legally to re-
tain the title in property while, for tax purposes, give up half the
legal title to his wife.21 7 Granting a married couple the benefit of
income splitting without regard to legal ownership of property
provides no incentive for the actual sharing of legal ownership of
property during marriage, however.1 ' The more nearly equal
sharing of property ownership among married couples can be
seen as a good in itself.2 9 Apart from whatever intrinsic value
213. Cf. Note, Tax Consequences of an Intrafamily Transfer of a Business Prop-
erty into Trust for Dependents with a Leaseback by the Grantor's Business, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1420, 1448 (1973). ("The apparent policies underlying a progressive income tax
system are turned upside down. To those who already have, more is given. Machiavellian
justification could be that the poor are appeased by the appearance of an income level-
ling system while the wealthy are in reality permitted to keep more of their
income . . ").
214. E.g., McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 1, at 1597; McMahon, supra note 80, at
124.
215. Federal Income Tax Project (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1982).
216. Id. at 21.
217. E.g., Hearings, supra note 47, at 196 (Report of the Action Group on the Mar-
riage Tax Penalty to the Tax Subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Task Force on
Women).
218. Gann, supra note 48, at 27.
219. Green Paper, supra note 34, at 2.
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comes from greater sharing, it may reduce the likelihood of con-
flict-or at least simplify adjudication of rights-upon death
and divorce.220 Arguably, such a reform of property law practice
would be unseemly in the tax system. However, tax treatment of
property would simply be made more realistic-if one spouse is
willing to part with legal title to investment holdings, let the
favorable tax consequences follow. Finally, the concept of legal
title has force in and of itself, and is emphasized by the current
trend toward greater recognition of the property rights of mar-
ried women.
Another, more direct possible check on property transfers
within the family is a capital transfer or gift tax, perhaps im-
posed on transfers among the same persons listed for attribution
purposes in I.R.C. section 318. A moderate tax on such transfers
would not unduly restrict alienation of property, yet would pre-
vent the shifting of property back and forth among family mem-
bers according to yearly fluctuations in income.
With respect to income shifting, mandatory separate filing
is admittedly imperfect. Those high income taxpayers with
transferable property will be in a better position to benefit from
lower tax through manipulation of the system than either lower
income taxpayers or those with predominantly earned income.
The availability of Individual Retirement Accounts to provide
tax relief on earned income, however, mitigates to an extent the
disproportionate burden of those who have predominantly or ex-
clusively earned income. 2 1 Furthermore, the current system, ar-
guably is even more beneficial to high income taxpayers. None-
theless, the possibility of greater transaction costs and potential
litigation exists, although the laissez-faire approach suggested
herein indicates that less of a problem would develop than is
currently experienced in Canada.
With the understanding that some shifting will occur, the
choice has been made in favor of attempting to simplify the sys-
tem wherever possible. It is assumed that rules such as the fam-
ily partnership regulations, the Clifford rules, and the ALI trusts
220. Hearings, supra note 47, at 143 (statement of Pamela B. Gann).
221. Professor Surrey, writing in 1948, noted that the introduction of income split-
ting was such a boon to executives and professionals that it obviated the needed for any
Individual Retirement Account-type proposals to shelter earned income for them. Sur-
rey, supra note 13, at 1113.
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proposal will be applied. These provisions, along with use of a
transfer tax and the nature of a transfer of legal title in and of
itself, will serve as a deterrent to capricious shifting. In light of
the elimination of income splitting and the greater progressivity
effected by use of personal exemption credits instead of deduc-
tions, the advantages should outweigh the problems of income
shifting under the proposed system.
3. Revenue Costs and Shifts in Tax Burden
Separate taxation of married couples as individuals would
decrease the aggregate tax liability for a substantial majority of
two-earner married couples and increase the liability of one-
earner couples and two-earner couples with substantially dispro-
22portionate incomes. 22 The treatment of single people would re-
main unchanged. Because of abandonment of multiple rate
schedules, single heads of households would pay a slightly higher
tax. The removal of the work disincentive effect on second earn-
ers should expand the work force, generating revenue which
could finance tax cuts. While an across-the-board tax cut would
not change the relative contributions of each category of taxpay-
ers, it would mitigate the effect of the greater burden upon the
one-earner couples and actually lessen the tax load on singles.
Concededly, one-earner couples would bear a larger share of
the tax bill under mandatory separate filing than they paid
under income splitting, but in the latter case one-earner couples
paid less than their share. The proposed system seems to reflect
more nearly the appropriate balance of contribution, as well as
the appropriate balance of equities. Finally, if demographic
trends continue, the percentage of married couples in which
both spouses work, already greater than fifty percent, will
increase.
4. Other Policy Justifications
Two other related reasons exist for incorporating mandatory
separate filing into the tax system: the right of an individual to
be taxed as an individual, and the recognition of the changing
status of women.
222. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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Although the current system technically allows a married
couple to, file separately, satisfying a possible due process
claim,223 individual treatment is effectively not given, because in
the majority of cases the tax rate is higher than that applicable
to married couples filing jointly and splitting income.
In rejecting a joint tax return, the words of the Taxation
Review Committee of Australia are instructive:
The adoption of a compulsory family unit basis must be re-
jected on grounds of general social principle. The right to be
taxed as an individual has always been accorded in Australia. A
time when women are playing an ever greater role in the eco-
nomic and other affairs of society, the withdrawal of this right
would certainly be regarded as a retrograde step.... [M]en
too might take exception to a universal and compulsory com-
mingling of their tax affairs with those of their wives. This
would, in the Committee's view, make a change in this direc-
tion politically unacceptable .... Social attitudes to the sepa-
rate status of the sexes, rather than purely economic considera-
tions, are involved here.
22'
Although acknowledging conflicting considerations, there may be
a general lack of understanding or an underestimation of the de-
gree to which the choice of a tax unit is bound up in ideological
and personal considerations of the social roles of men and
women.225 It is important to address these ideological questions
explicitly.
International trends in the last decade toward separate tax-
ation of spouses as individuals 226 reflect the growing importance
attached to the status and role of women in society.227 The social
roles of women and men have changed. In 1948, when income
splitting was introduced, one commentator wrote that "[in the
general family picture, it is the husband who is the earner of
wages, salary, or business profits, thereby providing both the
dollars of income and the accumulation of capital producing ad-
223. See Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
224. Taxation Review Committee, Full Report 134 (Australia, 1975).
225. Lister, supra note 34, at 141.
226. Green Paper, supra note 34, at 23.
227. ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNoMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS, THE TREATMENT OF FAILY UNITS IN OECD MEMER CouNTmRs UNDER TAX
AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 8 (1977).
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ditional dollars of income. 228 The fact that over half of married
couples today are two-earner couples demonstrates one aspect of
the change in the norm. To those who argue that the tax system,
for the good of society, should not encourage the wife to leave
home to work, the response is that of Simone de Beauvoir:
[W]oman's inferiority originated in her being at first limited to
repeating life, whereas man invented reasons for living more
essential, in his eyes, than the not-willed routine of mere exis-
tence; to restrict woman to maternity would be to perpetuate
this situation. She demands today to have a part in that mode
of activity in which humanity tries continually to find justifica-
tion through transcendence, through movement toward new
goals and accomplishments; she cannot consent to bring forth
life unless life has meaning; she cannot be a mother without
endeavoring to play a role in the economic, political and social
life of the times .... [Tjhe woman who works-farmer, chem-
ist, or writer-is the one who undergoes pregnancy most easily
because she is not absorbed in her own person; the woman who
enjoys the richest individual life will have the most to give her
children and will demand the least from them; she who ac-
quires in effort and struggle a sense of true human values will
be best able to bring them up properly.229
The system of separate filing does not prefer one role over the
other. It simply neutrally provides each spouse with a choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In fairness, there can be no normative response to the ques-
tion of the taxable unit and the family unit. In one commenta-
tor's words, "the expert must give way to the citizen, whose
judgments in the end can rest on nothing more precise or per-
manent than collective social preferences."2 30 Or, as the same
observation was made in 1946, "these are technical observations
whereas the subject matter involved belongs to the public. So we
must leave our conclusions to the test of the afternoon club
228. Surrey, supra note 13, at 980.
229. S. DE BEAUVOIr, THE SECOND SEX 495 (H. Parshley transl. & ed. 1949), quoted
in Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Work-
ing Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49, 95 (1971).
230. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1463.
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meeting, the locker room, and the bridge table."2 31 If in the end,
subjective and political jUdgments are inescapable, we must
search for the simplest, most equitable and acceptable solution.
For, unless the tax system is generally recognized as fair, the
fundamental purpose of the tax will be lost; when the people feel
the tax system is unfair, the social and political system under
which it operates is in danger of collapse.
231. Surrey, supra note 13
1983] 883
55
Winn and Winn: Till Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
56
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/2
